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In Ireland there has been a long standing concern that people from a low socio-economic 
status (SES) backgrounds are heavily under-represented in higher education in general and 
universities  in  particular.  This  has  been  well  established  in  several  official  reports  and 
particularly the work of Patrick Clancy, for example Clancy (1988, 2001) and most recently 
O’Connell  et  al  (2006).  This  implies  a  high  inter-generational  correlation  in  educational 
attainment and this clearly constrains social mobility. Leaving aside concerns about equity, it 
also  implies  an  efficiency  loss  to  the  economy.  The  educational  immobility  between 
generations in Ireland is high relative to many other countries: in a cross-country study of 
inter-generational educational mobility using data on OECD countries Chevalier et al (2009) 
find  that  the  association  between  education  levels  of  individuals  and  their  parents  was 
highest in Ireland
1. One might expect two sets of actions to follow from this: intensive studies 
to understand why this is the case and, building on the ensuing findings, policies to redress it. 
Unfortunately while the problem of educational inequality is well known, there has been a 
dearth  of  research  which  establishing  why  low  SES  groups  do  not  progress  to  higher 
education. There  are  some  qualitative  studies on the  subject as  well as  numerous  policy 
evaluations and reviews
2. However these cannot (nor do they claim to) establish what the 
causal mechanisms behind educational disadvantage are, still less to quantify them. Hence 
they are of fairly limited assistance in the design of policy.  
A proximate explanation for this dearth of work in Ireland is the lack of suitable publicly 
available data that would allow one to investigate these matters. So while the scale of the 
problem has been well documented, remarkably little is known about the underlying causes. 
                                                 
1 Using a different methodology and different data, Asplund et al (2008) also find that for a 
subset of OECD countries the association between higher education and parental education is 
highest  in  Ireland.  Throughout  the  paper,  references  to  Ireland  exclude  Northern  Ireland 
which is part of the United Kingdom. 
2 For example Lynch & Riordan (1996), Osbourne & Leith (2000), Department of Education & 
Science (2001,2003).    2 
That said, the government operates several programs to deal with educational disadvantage 
in schools under the heading “Delivering Equality of Opportunity in Schools” (DEIS). These 
programmes  provide  differential  support  to  schools  that  have  been  designated  as 
disadvantaged  (“DEIS  schools”).  The  effects  of  these  programs  have  not  in  general  been 
studied using methods that would allow one to infer whether they have been effective or not.  
This paper examines one of the most significant changes to higher education in Ireland in 
recent decades, the abolition of undergraduate university fees for Irish and EU students in 
1996. To understand the consequences of this reform it is also instructive to examine the 
factors which predict academic success at secondary level, specifically in the national exams 
taken by students who remain in school until the end of the secondary system. 
In the absence of previous comparable studies for Ireland, it is worthwhile looking at the 
international literature. The effects of SES on access for higher education and the impact of 
changes  in  educational  financing  are  two  of  the  most  widely  studied  questions  in  the 
economics of education. There is, not surprisingly, a wide range of findings which are difficult 
to summarize succinctly. In an influential study Carneiro & Heckman (2002) find that only a 
small proportion (around 8%) of US school leavers were credit constrained when it came to 
attending higher education. Applying the same methodology to UK data, Dearden et al (2004) 
also find that credit constraints are comparatively unimportant.  So these papers would tend 
to suggest that it is long run factors that are important and hence changes in tuition costs are 
unlikely to be important. Using a different approach, a recent study for the UK, Chowdry et al 
(2010) finds that most of the differences in participation in higher education across socio-
economic groups can be explained by school attainment. In a Canadian study, Levin (1990) 
finds  that  a  policy  of  low  tuition  fees  has  not  resulted  in  substantial  changes  in  the 
composition of the university population though a more recent study finds for Canada found 
that increases in tuition costs has substantial negative effects on enrolment, see Neill (2009).  
However this is not to imply money does not matter in general. A review of US studies, by 
Deming & Dynarski (2009), finds that financial aid to students can be effective at increasing 
participation (& retention) at university depending on how the programme is designed. So it 
is far from clear, a priori, what to expect from the abolition of university fees and it will, in 
general, depend on local circumstances and institutions.   3 
The Irish educational system consists of six years of primary school (often preceded by two 
years of pre-school) followed by secondary school which lasts five or six years. After three 
years of secondary school (usually at the age of 15 or 16), students take the Junior Certificate, 
a nationwide exam, usually in 8 or 9 subjects. Some students leave at this stage
3.  
The senior cycle of secondary school can be completed in two years, however many students 
take a “transition year” first emphasizing non-academic skills before starting the two year 
preparation for the final Leaving Certificate (LC) examination. The LC is usually taken in 7 or 8 
subjects but only the best six are counted for the purpose of university qualification. As with 
the Junior Certificate, English, Irish & Mathematics are compulsory. Papers can be taken at a 
higher or lower level (“Honours” and “Pass”). The students’ grades on the best six subjects 
are summarized in a single points score with a maximum of 100 points per subject for a total 
maximum of 600 points. 
Application  to  universities  in  Ireland  is  through  a  centralized  clearing  house,  the  Central 
Applications Office (CAO).  Students make one application on which they list their top 10 
choices of degree programme. This application is made in the final year of secondary school 
and before they take the LC. Offers for a place on a particular course at a particular university 
are made to the highest scoring students who applied for that course at that university as 
their first preference.
4 Further offers are made on the basis of grades until all places have 
been filled – some students will turn down their initial offers. Students who are not offered 
their first ranked course are then considered for their second ranked course and the process 
continues  until  all  places  are  allocated.  As  the  number  of  students  applying  for  places 
generally exceeds the supply the system is characterized by a high level of excess demand and 
particularly for more prestigious courses. Students are free to repeat the exams and re-apply 
or they may apply in one year on the basis of their exams taken in a previous year. In making 
an application, it is not possible to combine exam results from different years.  
                                                 
3 The “retention rate”, the proportion of the cohort which starts secondary school and remain 
to take the Leaving Certificate, has risen steadily since the 1960s. In 1960 the rate was 20% 
and  was  about  75%  in  1995.  Thereafter  growth  has  leveled  off  at  just  over  80%,  see 
Department of Education (2008) Figure F. 
4 Details of the scoring system are at www.cao.ie/index.php?page=scoring, see also Gormley 
and Murphy (2006) for a detailed description of the university admissions system in Ireland. 
As of 2009, entrance to medical schools depends also depends on an aptitude test. 
   4 
Figure 1 graphs the total number of applications made for higher education courses made via 
the CAO. From 1979 to 1990 (inclusive) only applications for degree courses in universities 
were made through the CAO. For these years one can see that the number of applicants is a 
multiple of the number of acceptances (which is essentially the number of places available). 
Not all students who apply will subsequently achieve the minimum points required to enter 
university so the “true” excess demand may be less that the gap between the number of 
applications and the number of acceptances. Nevertheless, the basic picture would not be 
changed if one allows for this. After 1990, the CAO also dealt with applications for degree and 
non-degree (i.e. diploma) courses in non-university institutions hence the increase in both the 
number of applications and acceptances. While this complicates the picture somewhat the 
basic fact, of a high level of excess demand for higher education places, is unchanged. 
 The minimum level of points required to enter particular programs varies widely both across 
subject and, to a lesser extent, across institution. To enter medicine (or veterinary medicine) 
in any university typically requires around 570 points, business, law and engineering degrees 
are usually in the 440-520 range with humanities and social sciences in the 330-400 range. In 
general it does not matter through which LC subjects a student acquires their points: it is 
simply  the  total  that  counts  although  some  programmes,  like  Engineering  and  Medicine, 
require minimum levels of attainment in some LC science subjects. 
There  are  seven  universities  in  Ireland  as  well  as  a  medical  school,  the  Royal  College  of 
Surgeons in Ireland (RCSI), and St Patricks Pontifical University, a religious institution. There 
are fourteen institutes of technology, six teacher training colleges and approximately eleven 
other  institutions  (including  private  colleges  and  colleges  specialising  in  theology,  hotel 
management, arts and other areas)
5. In 2004 the universities and institutes of technology 
accounted for 47.3% and 41.9% respectively of new entrants to higher education
6.  This paper 
is concerned only with entrance to the universities (but excluding St Patricks) as they form a 
distinct group. Institutes of technology provide a diverse range of courses in more vocational 
areas and award a mixture of degrees, diplomas and other certification. Some, but not all, 
                                                 
5 See O’Connell et al (2006) figure 1.3 p.17 for a list. 
6 ibid Table 2.1 p.22. In the period which this paper studies, the mid 1990s, the relative 
proportions were similar.    5 
students enter the institutes of technology through the same centralized clearing house as 
the universities.  
The  government  operates  a  Higher  Education  grant  scheme,  administered  by  local 
governments, which provides a means tested benefit to students attending higher education. 
Prior to the abolition of fees, it covered fees and a contribution to living expenses. These 
grants were available for both undergraduate and postgraduate study. There are four levels 
of financial support contingent on parental income:  
1.  50% of fees 
2.  100% of fees 
3.  100% fees plus part maintenance grant 
4.  100% fees plus full maintenance grant 
The income threshold depends on the number of children in the household.  There are two 
levels  of  maintenance  grant  payable,  an  “adjacent  rate”  if  the  student  lives  within  24 
kilometres of the university/institute and a “non-adjacent rate” if they are further away. The 
latter is 2.5 times the adjacent rate
7. The income thresholds are revised periodically to take 
account of inflation as are the levels of maintenance grant
8. This means that in periods of high 
inflation the real value of the threshold below which income must fall declines i.e. it becomes 
more difficult to qualify.  
When considering the effects of any reforms to higher education in Ireland it needs to be 
borne  in  mind  that  the  system  has  expanded  considerably  and  fairly  steadily  in  recent 
decades. In 1980, 20% of those at school leaving age were admitted to higher education. By 
1992, this had risen to 36% and had reached 54% by 2003. The growth has now tapered off 
considerably
9. This growth in numbers is a consequence of a policy of expanding the numbers 
of places, see Figure 1 for example.  
In  1995,  the  government  decided  to  abolish  undergraduate  fees  for  Irish  and  other  EU 
students, although students doing part-time degrees were still liable for fees. The reform is 
                                                 
7 I have drawn on Clancy & Kehoe (1999) for this description of the grant system see also 
www.studentfinance.ie for current details of the system. After 1996, the system did not cover 
undergraduate fees obviously. 
8 Remarkably, the income thresholds were not adjusted for inflation between 1968 and 1981, 
see Barlow (1981). The revisions have been more frequent since then. 
9 These numbers are from O’Connell et al (2006) Figure 1.2 p.16.   6 
generally  referred  to  as  the  “free  fees”  initiative.  Fees  were  cut  by  50%  in  1995  and 
eliminated thereafter. In addition a tax covenant scheme whereby family members of fee 
paying  students  could  effectively  write  off  these  fees  against  tax  was  abolished.  The 
universities received a block grant in lieu of the fee income. This policy was outlined in a 
government White Paper in which it was asserted that “These decisions are a major step 
forward in the promotion of equality. They remove important financial and psychological 
barriers to participation at third level.” (Department of Education & Science (1995), p106).  
No evidence was cited to support this ex ante or ex post. Some of the thinking behind this 
change has also been provided, albeit retrospectively, by the Minister of Education at the 
time of the reform who attributes to the reform increased numbers at university, seemingly 
unaware of the consistent upward trend in numbers throughout the period generated by 
increased supply, see Bhreathnach (2008). More cynical observers have suggested that the 
imminence of a general election (one was held in 1997) may have been responsible for the 
apparent alacrity with which the reform was introduced. At the time of the reform university 
fees  varied  between  degree  programs  significantly  (and  to  a  lesser  extent  between 
universities)  with  fees  in  subjects  like  medicine,  science  and  engineering  higher  than 
humanities, business and law
10. These fee differentials remain for non-EU students applying. 
An irony associated with the timing of this policy is its pro-cyclicality: at the Irish economy has 
started to grow rapidly with incomes rising across the board. 
A priori, given the high level of excess demand (with the number of applicants around twice 
the number of places) a reform which would stimulate demand seems unlikely to be effective. 
Moreover  it  achieves  this  by  changing  the  relative  price  against  the  population  who  are 
under-represented.  The  reform  also  clearly  generates  a  deadweight  loss:  individuals  who 
were willing to pay for an investment now benefitted from the investment at the taxpayers’ 
expense. An argument in favour of the policy that has been made was that the fees acted as a 
barrier to individuals whose parents’ income was just above the threshold to qualify for the 
Higher  Education  grant,  largely  from  low  income  white-collar  backgrounds.  Raising  the 
threshold would obviously have been a more efficient solution to this problem to the extent 
that it existed. 
                                                 
10 See Clancy & Kehoe (1999) Table 1, p.45 for example. Students who have to repeat an 
academic year are also liable for fees.   7 
This paper uses pooled cross-section survey data on school leavers to see whether the reform 
in  question  changed  the  SES  gradient  with  respective  to  university  progression.  It  also 
examines a closely related question the extent to which family background, including SES, 




The data used to conduct the analysis is the ESRI School Leavers Survey. This is a random 
sample of individuals, collected annually, who were sampled approximately 9 months after 
they leave school
11. The sample size varies between 2000 to 3000. The analysis here uses case 
deletion which reduces the effective sample size. Since the reform occurs in 1996, we use 
data for years 1994-1998 to abstract from any trends that may be occurring. Data for the 
years 1991-1993 are also available, however the results are not substantially changed if all 
years are included. After the period, the survey was discontinued although its collection has 
been resumed subsequently. 
Because individuals are sampled 9 months after leaving school, those who start university 
after this will not be recorded as university students. Universities have “mature student” 
programs to encourage access by those who have left school a few years. In addition, one 
university has an evening degree though prospective students must have left school several 
years before they can enter this program. However in Ireland these forms of progression to 
university are relatively unusual and account for a small proportion of university students. 
Compared  to  the  US,  for  example,  Ireland  is  not  a  “second  chance”  society  with  most 




To  investigate  the  possible  effect  of  the  abolition  of  fees  on  progression  to  university  I 
estimate  a  set  of  probit  models  using  pooled  cross-section  data  for  a  five  year  period 
spanning  the  reform.  As  noted  above,  higher  education  in  Ireland  is  and  has  been 
                                                 
11 For more details on this data source see, for example, Byrne et al (2009).    8 
characterized  by  significant  excess  demand.  So  increases  in  aggregate  participation  are 
uninformative about any changes in demand. Having investigated the participation decision, 
an analysis of the determinants of attainment at second level is presented since this sheds a 
great deal of light on how SES impacts on university progression. 
 
3.1 Modelling the probability of going to university 
 
This  section  models  the  probability  of  a  school  leaver  progressing  to  university.  The 
dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individual went to university or not. Table 1(a) 
and 1(b) contain cross tabulations of the dependent variable against two measures of the 
father’s economic circumstances, a 6 category classification of SES and a binary indicator for 
whether he was unemployed. Descriptive statistics for the regression sample are in Table 2. 
One  can  see  from  a  glance  at  Table  1(a)  that  the  proportion  of  respondents  going  to 
university is higher for those with higher SES backgrounds, the Pearson test rejects the null of 
independence: c
2(5)=237, p=.000. Table 1(b) shows a positive association between going to 
university  and  one’s  father  being  employed.  The  Pearson  test  again  rejects  the  null  of 
independence: c
2(5)=33.12, p=.000. 
Table 3 presents the results from four models with different specifications. The first column 
models  attending  university  as  a  function  of  the  student’s  socio-economic  background 
measured in terms of their father’s occupation and labour market status and a small number 
of other characteristics but excluding any measure of performance in school
12.  The first three 
coefficients show the socio-economic gradient: a student whose father is a professional is 
about 30% (i.e. 30 percentage points) more likely to attend university than one who’s father is 
semi- or unskilled. For the child of a father in the “other white collar” category the probability 
of attending university is 11% higher. That such a gradient exists is not surprising since the 
higher attendance at university by those of higher SES has been documented exhaustively in a 
series of reports published by the Higher Education Authority and initially compiled by Patrick 
Clancy starting in 1982, see Clancy (1982,2001) for example and O’Connell et al (2004). 
                                                 
12 All models include a full set of region dummies (i.e. where the students are from) and year 
dummies which will control for any aggregate changes such as the expansion of the university 
sector in general.   9 
 However multivariate analyses of this relationship are much less common and there does not 
appear to be papers which allow for school performance as this one does. It is worth noting 
that  there  is  no  statistically  significant  difference  between  the  different  three  lower  SES 
categories: the children of skilled, semi-skilled and un-skilled manual workers – the latter two 
being the omitted category. In general the earnings of the fathers in these three groups could 
differ quite significantly thus if credit constraints were in operation we would expect to find 
some differences in the proportion of their children attending university. By contrast, those 
whose  fathers  are  unemployed  are  about  7%  less  likely  to  go  to  university,  which  may 
indicate the presence of credit constraints. However it is important to bear in mind that those 
from low income backgrounds are likely to be in receipt of the Higher Education grant which 
may have had the effect of neutralizing any credit constraints
13.  
The second model adds measures of the student’s performance in the Leaving Certificate 
which is the nationwide baccalaureate type exam which is required for entry to university
14. I 
include the number of LC points achieved and the number of honours grades (an A, B or C on 
a higher level exam) and the number of fails (E or lower on any exam). Alternatively one could 
have included some non-linearity in the total number of points such as a polynomial or a 
linear  spline  function  however  the  results  of  interest  are  not  sensitive  to  this  choice.  As 
expected, the probability of attending university is increasing in the points score and the 
number of honours and is decreasing in the number of fails. What is important here is the 
impact of these variables on the coefficients for father’s SES and labour market status: they 
are clearly much smaller & less well determined than in the previous model. A joint test for 
their statistical significance is borderline c
2(4)=9.33 , p=.0533. It is also interesting that once 
one includes these Leaving Certificate variables that the coefficient on the female dummy 
variable is no longer statistically significance i.e. all of the differences between the sexes in 
terms of going to university can be explained by the fact that the girls do better in school.  
                                                 
13 At the time of the reform, for example about 30% of undergraduates at University College 
Dublin, Ireland’s largest university, were in receipt of the High Education Grant (author’s 
calculations). 
14 Students applying from outside Ireland qualify on the basis of their own national exams 
while a very small number of Irish students take the International Baccalaureate or UK A 
levels.    10 
It is clear that the coefficients on SES are a fraction of what they were in the previous model 
(column 1).  The third model addresses the possible impact of the abolition of university fees 
by  including  a  set  of  interactions  between  a  “free  fees”  dummy  variable  with  the  four 
measures  of  the  father’s  economic  circumstances  (the  three  SES  dummies  &  father’s 
unemployment).  The  “free  fees”  dummy  variable  indicates  if  the  respondent  entered 
university  after  1995.  The  results  show  that  the  inclusion  of  these  variables  does  not 
substantially  change  the  results  of  interest.  A  test  for  the  joint  significance  of  the  four 
interactions is c
2(4)=5.23, p=.2644. A test for the joint significance of the original four direct 
effects  is  now  c
2(4)=3.06  ,  p=.5477  while  a  test  for  the  joint  significance  of  all  eight 
coefficients is c
2(8)=14.40, p=.0718.  
Since students were liable for 50% of fees in 1995 an alternative specification of the reform is 
as  a  step  function  equal  to  0  before  1995,  0.5  in  1995  and  1  thereafter.  Repeating  the 
estimates in Table 3 but using this step function to generate the interactions does not change 
noticeably:  the  p  values  for  the  three  tests  reported  above  are  .2027,  .6957  and  .0561 
respectively. Since it is possible that secondary school students in 1996 might not have had 
time to adjust their plans to the abolition of fees, the final column repeats the model in 
column 3 but omitting that year. It is obvious that this too does not change the results to any 
noticeable degree.  
The  results  and  these  robustness  tests  demonstrate  clearly  that  the  policy  of  abolishing 
university fees did nothing with regard to improving access to university amongst low SES 
students which was a stated objective of the policy. Bearing in mind that most low income 
students would typically not have been paying university fees (since most would be in receipt 
of the Higher Education grant) one would not expect a reform which largely benefitted better 
off students  to somehow benefit low SES students. The logic of this apparently escaped 
policy makers at the time.  
 
3.2 Modelling the predictors of secondary school academic success 
 
Given the evident importance of Leaving Certificate success for university and its implication 
for the SES gradient it is worth investigating what are the predictors of this success so in this   11 
section I model the determinants of LC points using linear regression. One could also apply 
this or similar approaches to the number of honours or fails grades achieved but it would add 
little of substance to the general findings. Before looking at the results of the estimation, it is 
worth graphing the distribution of Leaving Certificate point to get an idea of what we might 
expect, see Figure 2. 
The location of the graph is as one would predict, the points distribution for those whose 
fathers are professional is to the right followed by that of other non-manuals relative to that 
of manual workers. However the graph reveals another interesting feature other than the 
location of the means: the distribution for those from manual backgrounds is skewed right: 
that is not only are their points lower than average but very few get high points (which would 
be required for entry into the most sought-after degree programmes such as medicine). For 
the other two groups the reverse is true with the distributions skewed to the left: the chances 
of a student from a white-collar background achieving low points are quite low. Why this is so 
is unclear. Whether this is due to how the respective schools operate or their parents is a 
moot point.  
On the basis of the results in Table 3 and Figure 1 one expects to find an SES gradient with 
respect to points. Column 1 of Table 4 shows the results of a simple linear regression using 
the same covariates as in Table 3
15. What is very striking is the size of the coefficients on 
father’s SES: the child of a professional can expect to get about 92 points (about .76 of a 
standard deviation) more Leaving Certificate points than the child of a manual worker. For the 
children of other non-manual workers the advantage is smaller, but sizeable, at around 47 
points. The child of an unemployed man can expect to get about 30 points fewer. This clearly 
explains why, in Table 3, once one controls for Leaving Certificate points, the direct effect of 
SES essentially disappears.  
Some of the other coefficients are notable. It is striking that a student’s father being disabled 
is associated with a large penalty in terms of points. The data does not tell us whether the 
student is disabled unfortunately. It is possible that there may be some inter-generational 
correlation in disability (for example, if there is a congenital defect) so that this variable is 
picking up the student’s own disability but it seems unlikely that this is the explanation. It 
                                                 
15  The  interactions  with  the  reform  are  not  included  since  one  would  not  expect  the 
relationship to change with the abolition of university fees.   12 
seems more plausible that having a disabled parent effectively imposes a cost on a student, 
perhaps through reducing the study time available to them if the student has to participate 
more in home duties or take on paid employment. Since it is the disability of the father that 
matters, typically the main earner in the household, this suggests that it is the effect on 
household income that is driving this result. 
One might conjecture that this effect differs between male and female students (for example 
if  daughters  are  more  likely  to  take  on domestic  responsibilities)  but one  can  reject  this 
hypothesis,  F(2,4959)=0.68,  p=.509.  The  last  coefficient of  interest  is whether  one  of  the 
student’s parents is deceased. This too is associated with a significant penalty in terms of 
lower points. Similar findings to these have been reported in the international literature, for 
example  Chen  et  al  (2009)  or  the  extensive  literature  on  the  consequences  of  single-
parenthood for example McLanahan and Sandefur (1997). Unfortunately the data does not 
tell us how long the parent has been deceased and one might expect this to matter nor is 
there other information on family structure such as birth order, siblings or the presence of 
step-parents. 
A linear regression models the conditional mean of the distribution so in this case it tells us 
how an average student with particular characteristics can be expected to perform in the LC. 
However the mean is not the only parameter of interest. Koenker & Basset (1978) developed 
quantile  regression  to  model  conditional  quantile  functions.  It  generalizes  Least  Absolute 
Deviations which models the conditional median function. While this technique is now widely 
used in applied labour economics, especially in the study of earnings, care needs to be taken 
in the interpretation of the results. In particular it needs to be remembered that the different 
quantile  functions  refer  to  the  conditional,  not  the  unconditional  distribution,  of  Y.  The 
interpretation here follows that of Arias et al (2001) which models earnings. To recall, the 
model is 
 
Y= bX + e 
 
In this case Y is our LC points variable and X is a design matrix of covariates (including a 
constant) with associated parameter vector b. The disturbance term, e , reflects unobserved   13 
factors that generate high levels of points as well as any measurement error which is assumed 
to be classical. Unobserved factors could include the innate ability of the students or perhaps 
school quality. Since our model is necessarily simple, many factors could enter here. So in 
modelling the conditional distribution of Y given X one is modelling the distribution of e. 
Hence one can think of the higher conditional quantiles as corresponding to “lucky” students 
in that they have some unobserved characteristic(s) which generates higher scores in the 
exams. This paper interprets e as reflecting largely unobserved ability but it could also reflect 
other factors such as school quality. 




th percentiles. One could have estimated a larger number of functions, 
for  example  corresponding  to  the  deciles,  but  the  basic  picture  does  not  change  so  for 
reasons of parsimony three quantile functions suffice. 
The coefficients on fathers’ SES are higher at the lower quantiles, with a big difference for the 
effect of having a father who is professional at the 25
th   percentile compared to the 75
th 
percentile (113.03 vs. 74.04). Therefore if a student at the 25
th percentile of the conditional 
distribution is, other things being equal, less able that someone at the 75
th then having a high 
SES  father  have  a  greater  impact  on  their  points  at  the  margin  (relative  to  the  omitted 
category). Intuitively this could be because the high ability student “needs” less help or is able 
to achieve his/her potential with less assistance. Alternatively it may be the case that parents 
choose to provide greater assistance to their less able children. One can only speculate as to 
the reason for this difference.  
The same pattern applies for most of the other parental characteristics such as the penalty 
associated with having a deceased parent or a disabled father. That is, a student who is 
“unlucky” - in the sense of being at a lower conditional quantile of attainment- will suffer a 
great penalty if they are unfortunate enough to have a deceased parent or a disabled father. 
The size of these penalties, of the order of 50-70 points, is significant in that it would have 
sizeable impact on what degree program a student could enrol in. One way of interpreting 
this, perhaps, is that those at the lower quantiles are more vulnerable to these disadvantages. 
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4. Conclusions and implications for policy 
 
For young people from a low SES background in Ireland who wish to progress to university the 
dice are firmly loaded against them
16. They will, on average, perform much worse in school 
and this is why they are less likely to be successful when it comes to attending university. The 
extent  of  this  disadvantage  may  have  lessened  somewhat  in  recent  decades  as  higher 
education  has  expanded  considerably.  Hence  policies  that  do  not  directly  address  the 
underperformance at secondary level (i.e. high school) are unlikely to have a major impact on 
the problem. 
The  main  purpose  of  this  paper  was  to  investigate  the  effect,  if  any,  of  the  abolition  of 
university fees in Ireland in the mid-1990s. This reform, and the possibility of reversing it, has 
come under renewed discussion in recent years partly because of financial pressures on the 
universities as well as a desire for greater financial autonomy by them. However a defence of 
the reform that is commonly offered is that, somehow, it lead to greater access by groups 
that have been traditionally under-represented in higher education in general and university 
in particular. On the face of it, this is highly unlikely to be true since prior to the reform many 
low income students did not pay fees because they received a means tested grant covering 
both tuition costs and a contribution to their living expenses. In effect, the reform withdrew 
the one advantage that low income students had relative to high income students. Defenders 
of the policy might to a general increase in access by low income group over-time. This is not 
serious evidence and ignores, in particular, the secular increase in the supply of places as 
universities and other higher education institutions expanded, see the numbers cited on page 
5 above and Figure 1. Indeed while the absolute numbers from low SES groups rose, as a 
share they remained constant
17. The research design used here, a micro-econometric analysis 
using a large representative sample, over a period spanning the introduction of the reform is 
clearly superior methodologically. 
                                                 
16 The latest figures, for the academic years beginning 2007 & 2008 actually show a small 
increase in the share of students coming from higher SES backgrounds, HEA(2010) Table 7.4. 
17 Department of Education & Science (2003), Table 2.6   15 
The  results  are  clear  and  striking:  the  socio-economic  gradient  with  regard  to  attending 
university can essentially be explained by differential performance at secondary school level.  
The gap between the sexes in progressing to university is also explained by the fact that girls 
do better in secondary school. In Ireland, the abolition of fees did not change the effect of SES 
on  university  entrance  which  was  effectively  zero  before  and  after  the  reform  once  one 
controls for exam performance. The only obvious effect of the policy was to provide a windfall 
gain to middle-class parents who no longer had to pay fees
18. The failure of this policy to 
redress educational inequalities should not come as a total surprise to policy makers, the 
OECD(2004) spelt it out quite bluntly (p.56): “The free fees policy has not had the effects that 
were hoped for in improving participation from students from disadvantaged backgrounds..”. 
Moreover, the results reported here are very similar to those reported for the UK in Chowdry 
et  al  (2009)  who  find  that  controlling  for  educational  attainment  at  second  level  largely 
explains  the  SES  gradient  with  respect  to  third  level  education.  As  Nicholas  Barr  put  it 
succinctly: “It’s attainment, stupid” (quoted in Gill (2009)). However in evaluating the absence 
of a direct SES effect conditional on school attainment it does not follow that “money doesn’t 
matter”. Low income students would typically be in receipt of a means tested grant and this 
may simply have neutralized the effect of any credit constraints.  
The policy implication that one can draw from this, and a theme that is emerging generally in 
the literature, is the importance of early interventions: disadvantage sets in early in life. Quite 
how early is unclear with some authors, notably James Heckman and co-authors, pointing to 
the necessity of very early interventions in life, see Doyle et al (2009) for an overview. So 
while this paper demonstrates that performance at the final secondary school exam is the 
proximate explanation for the SES gradient with respect to university it is not able to pinpoint 
the ultimate explanation i.e. what accounts for the differential performance at secondary 
level. It may be due to the differential effects of secondary schools however this cannot be 
assumed. It could, for that matter, be due to differences in primary schooling. Students from 
higher  SES  backgrounds  make  greater  use  of  private  tuition  in  preparing  for  the  Leaving 
Certificate  but,  paradoxically,  it  appears  to  have  no  beneficial  effect,  see  Smyth  (2009). 
Perhaps it has nothing to do with schools at all but evolve from the home environment and 
                                                 
18  There  is  anecdotal  evidence  that  this  increased  the  demand  for  fee  paying  secondary 
schools.    16 
parental investment in particular.  Most likely, it is a combination of these. So while this paper 
can help rule out some explanations, it cannot pinpoint exactly where the disadvantage sets 
in.  One would need much better data for this.  
This is not to say that early disadvantage cannot be remediated later to some extent. Irish 
universities operate “Access Programmes” which are interventions targeted at disadvantaged 
(“DEIS”) schools with a view to increasing the numbers of their students attending university 
and supporting those who do make it to university. Denny et al (2010) evaluates one of these 
programmes  and  finds  well  determined  positive  effects  on  students  who  received  the 
intervention. The scale of these programmes are relatively small however, between 1999 and 
2004 about 2% of the incoming undergraduates in University College Dublin, Ireland’s largest 
university, were part of this programme
19.  
The results also reiterate what might seem an obvious point namely that for policies to be 
successful they need to be targeted at the intended beneficiaries.  
While  this  paper  is  primarily  about  the  educational  consequences  of  socio-economic 
disadvantage,  it  has  also  provided  evidence  on  another,  perhaps  surprising,  form  of 
disadvantage namely large penalties – in the form of worse exam results- arising from having 
a deceased or disabled parent. Students with special needs in second and third level are given 
extra assistance for example additional time in exams. Here however the problem arises not 
from  the  student’s  own  disability  but  from  that  of  their  parents.  This  suggests  that  the 
education system needs to show greater awareness of such students, something which may 
not be easily achieved. We clearly need to know more about the mechanisms through which 
this disadvantage manifests itself for example is it because the student takes on additional 
responsibility in the home? One thing that is clear is that there are different domains of 
disadvantage and some of them may not be obvious.  
                                                 
19 See Denny et al (2010) Table 3.    17 
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Note: kernel density functions, Epanenikov kernels   22 
Table 1(a) Father’s SES & going to university 
                       
 
  At university  Not at university  Total 
       
Father professional  129  147  276 
  11.73  3.79  5.54 
Father managerial & technical  542  1410  1952 
  49.27  36.31  39.17 
Father lower non-manual  111  314  425 
  10.09  8.09  8.53 
Father skilled manual  194  1262  1456 
  17.64  32.50  29.22 
Father semi-skilled  108  689  797 
  9.82  17.74  15.99 
Father unskilled manual  16  61  77 
  1.45  1.57  1.55 
Total 
 
1,100  3883  4983 
       




Table 1(b) Father unemployed & going to university 
  At university  Not at university  Total 
       
Father employed  1062  3548  4610 
  96.55  91.37  92.51 
Father unemployed  38  335  373 
  3.45  8.63  7.49 
Total 
 
1,100  3883  4983 
       
Note: Column %’s below absolute numbers 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for regression sample 
  Mean  Std dev   
university  0.221  0.415   
points  275  121   
No. of honours  2.72  2.33   
No. of fails   0.304  0.677   
Father professional  0.055  0.229   
Father other white collar  0.477  0.500   
Father skilled manual  0.292  0.455   
Father unemployed  0.075  0.263   
“Free fees”* Father professional  0.027  0.162   
“Free fees”* Father other white collar  0.244  0.430   
“Free fees”* Father skilled manual  0.143  0.350   
“Free fees”* Father unemployed  0.041  0.198   
Father disabled  0.020  0.142   
Mother disabled  0.010  0.101   
Parent dead (either)  0.046  0.210   
Agee  18.62  0.986   
Urban  0.472  0.500   
Woman  0.509  0.500   
Note : n=4983. “other white collar” consists of the 2
nd & 3
rd categories in Table 1(a). The 
omitted category is the 5
th & 6
th categories: semi- & unskilled manual father. 
 
   24 
Table 3: probit models of attending university 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         




    (7.07)  (7.04)  (6.49) 
         




    (9.87)  (9.88)  (8.24) 
         




    (2.38)  (2.34)  (1.95) 
         
Father professional  0.305
***  0.0413  0.0231  0.0212 
  (8.03)  (1.85)  (0.80)  (0.79) 
         
Father other white collar  0.114
***  0.00688  0.0160  0.0138 
  (6.67)  (0.63)  (0.97)  (0.91) 
         
Father skilled manual  -0.0104  -0.00813  0.00743  0.0067 
  (0.56)  (0.68)  (0.39)  (0.38) 
         
Father unemployed  -0.0747
***  -0.00669  -0.0210  -0.0198 
  (3.79)  (0.41)  (1.15)  (1.19) 
         
“Free fees”*Father professional      0.0312  0.0114 
      (0.74)  (0.30) 
         
“Free fees”*Father other white collar      -0.0157  -0.0187 
      (0.79)  (0.95) 
         
“Free fees”*Father skilled manual      -0.0251  -0.0142 
      (1.28)  (0.63) 
         
“Free fees”*Father unemployed      0.0467  0.0440 
      (0.91)  (0.75) 
         
Father disabled  -0.0747
*  -0.00913  -0.00970  -0.0109 
  (2.21)  (0.31)  (0.33)  (0.37) 
         
Mother disabled  -0.0655  -0.0404
*  -0.0390  -0.0416
* 
  (1.42)  (2.04)  (1.92)  (2.57) 
         
Parent dead  -0.0265  0.0347  0.0340  0.0489 
  (1.03)  (1.43)  (1.410)  (1.74) 
 
 






  (11.44)  (4.49)  (4.47)  (3.75) 






  (10.61)  (4.14)  (4.12)  (3.85) 
         
woman  0.0576
***  -0.00179  -0.0018  -0.0027 
  (5.09)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.35) 
         
Pseudo r-sq  0.1385  0.4810  0.4820  0.4829 
Note: n=4983 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. Absolute t statistics in parentheses . Year & 
region dummies not shown. Model 4 excludes 1996, n=3900. Estimation is by probit: marginal 
effects shown. For father’s SES, three dummies are used “Father professional” corresponding 
to the 1
st category in Table 1(a) “Other white collar” corresponding to the next two and 
“Father skilled worker” corresponding to the 4
th category. The omitted category is semi & 
unskilled manual, the 5
th and 6
th categories.  
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Table 4: Determinants of Leaving Certificate points 
  OLS    Quantile 
regressions 
 
    .25  .50  .75 





  (12.73)  (10.59)  (9.59)  (8.48) 
         





  (10.49)  (7.32)  (7.23)  (7.59) 
         
“   skilled manual  -2.691  -3.333  -8.000  -6.442 
  (0.57)  (0.49)  (1.09)  (1.13) 
         





  (4.83)  (5.05)  (4.25)  (2.98) 
         





  (4.18)  (5.20)  (4.21)  (2.29) 
         
Mother disabled  -23.65  -36.67  -34.00  -46.92 
  (1.43)  (1.92)  (1.52)  (1.15) 
         





  (4.42)  (4.81)  (3.89)  (2.12) 






  (10.23)  (4.79)  (8.67)  (9.89) 






  (11.89)  (10.01)  (10.58)  (9.40) 






  (8.44)  (4.94)  (6.45)  (6.72) 
         
r-sq  0.1584  0.0806  0.1079  0.1076 
Notes: N=4983. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001.  Absolute t statistics in parentheses. The 
1
st column is a OLS regression. Columns 2-4 are quantile regressions. Coefficients for region & 
year dummies are not shown. T ratios for the quantile regressions are based on bootstrapped 
standard errors, 500 replications.  
 